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Abstract
The post-New Order Indonesian politics has provided a political opportunity 
structure for the state towards democratization. It has a double-edged sword 
whatsoever: on the one hand democratization could lead to the civic engagement, 
but on the other hand, it provides a hot bed for the flourishing of  anti-civic 
organization. As for the latter, following the fall of  authoritarian regime of 
new Order in 1998, Indonesians have also witnessed the birth of  transnational 
Islamist and radical organizations threatening the state’s integrity and peaceful 
coexistence of  the citizens. Amid the public appearance of  these radical 
organization, an issue of  ideological infiltration and sabotage of  radical 
organization upon mainstreaming moderate Muslim organizations, such as 
Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah do exist. This article tries to reveal the 
impacts of  a such infiltration practices and the extent that radical narratives 
win the minds and hearts of  important Muslim leaders. Taking a closer a 
look to Muslim leaders in Sampang district in the island of  Madura, the 
centrum of  traditionalist Muslim in Indonesian Islamo-landscape, finds out 
that intolerant and radical ideologies do resonate clearly among the leaders. This 
finding resort as an alarm and counter-narrative to the long-admired Islamic 
traditionalism as an important backbone for moderate Islam in Indonesia. 
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[Politik Indonesia paska Orde Baru memberi struktur peluang bagi negara 
untuk melakukan demokratisasi. Namun, demikian peluan tersebut 
sebenarnya bermata ganda, bisa menjadi ancama: pada satu sisi, democratisasi 
mampu melahirkan keterlibatan warga, namun pada sisi lainnya memberi 
peluang untuk semakin menguatnya kelompok anti-kewargaan. Untuk 
peluang terakhir ini, masyarakat Indonesia, sejak jatuhnya rejim otoriter Orde 
Baru pada tahun 1998, dapat dengan jelas menyaksikan lahirnya beragam 
kelompok Transnatisional-Islamis dan radikal yang menjadi ancaman bagi 
integritas negara dan keharmonisan hidup masyarakat Indonesia. Di tengah 
kemunculan kelompok tersebut di ranah publik, isu sabotase dan infiltrasi 
juga mengemuka; utamanya infiltrasi terhadap organisasi terbesar di Indonesia, 
Nahdlatul Ulama dan Muhammadiyah. Artikel ini akan mengulas dampak 
infiltrasi kelompok radikal dan sejauh mana pimpinan umat Islam terpapar 
oleh narasi radikalisme. Dengan mengetengahkan studi atas pimpinan Islam 
di Sampang, satu wilayah di Pulau Madura yang menjadi pusat kelompok 
Muslim tradisionalis, artikel ini menemukan bahwa narasi intoleran dan 
radikal cukup mengkhawatirkan. Temuan riset ini tentu saja menjadi 
peringatan dan sekaligus sebagai narasi bersebrangan dengan anggapan 
bahwa Islam traditisionalis merupakan salah satu penyanggah utama Islam 
moderat di Indonesia.
Keywords: Intolerant, Radicalism, Terrorism, Ulama
Introduction
The popular imaginary about the island of  Madura connects to 
the idea of  violence and Islamic traditionalism. Madura culture is a 
combination of  “syncretic abangan-like” and orthodox santri culture.1 It 
is an important home to the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia, 
Nahdlatul Ulama/NU.2 The importance of  NU to the lives of  Madurese 
1 Yanwar Pribadi, “An Abangan-like Group in a Santri Island: The Religious 
Identity of  the Blater,” in Religious Diversity in Muslim-Majority States in Southeast Asia: Areas 
of  Toleration and Conflict (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof  Ishak Institute, 2014), p. 214–234.
2 On NU see KH. Achmad Siddiq, Khittah Nahdliyyah (Surabaya: Khalista & 
LTN-NU Jawa Timur, 2006), p. 27; KH. Abdul Muchith Muzadi, NU dalam Perspektif 
Sejarah & Ajaran: Refleksi 65 Tahun Ikut NU (Surabaya: Khalista, 2007), p. 69-73.
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reflects an anecdote saying that being Muslim is tantamount to being NU 
followers. Another exaggerated tale on Madura Islam also says that while 
98% of  Madurese are Muslim, only 2% are Muhammadiyah.
The traditionalist Muslim boarding school or pesantren,3 mainly 
affiliated to NU, is paramount to the making of  santri culture in Madura. 
It is where Islamic traditionalism has been maintained for generations 
and its influences have crossed the geographical boundaries of  the island. 
Almost all important kiai (Muslim scholars) in Java take their genealogical 
knowledge (sanad) to famous kiai of  Madura. The most important kiai of 
Madura is the 19th century Muhammad Kholil bin Abdul Lathif  renowned 
for his nickname Kiai Kholil Bangkalan (1820-1925). In Madurese santri 
culture, the authority of  a kiai in Madura goes beyond their roles as a 
religious teacher who runs his pesantren. A kiai is the leader in Madurese 
society in general which in many cases trespassed the boundaries of  his 
roles as religious scholars.
This article discusses contemporary Islam in Madura, focusing 
on kiai and their Islamic narratives on violence, issues of  toleration, 
and radicalism. It poses a question the extent that kiai is exposed to the 
narratives of  intolerance and violence. This study is an in-depth-study as 
its main sources were collected from the field. To do so, in May-September 
2019, I conducted both face-to-face and in group interviews and a series 
of  focused group discussions (FGD) with important Muslim leaders in 
Madura, mainly kiais, security officers, and government officials, and 
Muslim students. All these fieldworks activities were carried out in the 
district of  Sampang.
Located in the mid-part of  the Madura Island, Sampang is less-
developed compared to other districts in the island of  Madura. Livestock 
3 Abdurrahman Mas’ud, Intelektual Pesantren: Perhelatan Agama dan Tradisi 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004), p. 9; Pesantren or Pondok Pesantren are Islamic boarding 
schools in Indonesia. They consist of  pondok, mosque, santri, teaching of  classical 
Islamic texts and kiai, Zamakhsyari Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: A Study of  the Role 
of  the Kiai in the Maintenance of  the Traditional Ideology of  Islam in Java Tempe, AZ: Arizona 
State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series.
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and petty farmers are two dominant bread-winning activities of  the 
people of  Sampang. Importantly, contemporary Sampang is the place 
for a violence against Shia community.4 In 2012, thirty-seven houses 
belonged to Shia community were burned down. The 2012 attack 
against Shia community killed one and dozens of  Shia communities 
were injured. Another casualty is the public discrimination against Shia 
as its members are driven out from the villages which led to the exodus 
of  Shia community to other cities in East Java province.5 
Considering the importance of  NU in Madura culture, the 
aforementioned incident clearly contrasts to the long-held belief  that NU 
is one of  most importance pillars of  peaceful and moderate Islam6 and 
the most important component of  Muslim civil society in Indonesia.7 
This article further argues that there has been a shifting terrain of  Islam 
in Madura. As far as, Muslim leaders in Sampang are concerned, they are 
exposed to the narratives of  intolerance and radicalism. Preserving the 
authenticity of  religion, thus exclusion of  the others, is the grand narrative 
which costed live casualties and begs further definition on moderate and 
anti-moderate—if  not to mention intolerant and radical—in Islamic 
discourses. Moreover, as this article demonstrates, there has been a 
shifting ideological and organisational affiliation among the Muslim 
leaders in Sampang. Though NU is still the dominant organisation to 
which the Muslim leaders ascribed, the contemporary development of 
Islam in Sampang could temper this assumption. There has been an 
4 Shia is a theological branch in Islam and takes its root to the first year following 
the death of  the Prophet Muhammad.
5 Muhammad Afdillah, “Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik: Studi Kasus Peran 
Pemuka Agama dan Politisi dalam Konflik Kekerasan Agama antara Komunitas Sunni 
dan Syiah di Sampang Jawa Timur,” Thesis, UGM, 2013; Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, “Kalim 
Religious Authority dalam Konflik Sunni-Syi’i Sampang Madura, Islamica, Vol 6, No. 
2, 2012.
6 Azyumardi Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context 
(Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006), p. 60-64.
7 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, n.d.).
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intermingled organisational affiliation among the Muslim leaders; thus 
the distinction between the traditionalist NU and other radical groups is 
blurring, particularly when they come to the issue of  religious authenticity 
and minority Muslim groups like the Shia community of  Sampang. 
Notes on Conceptual Frames
Before I proceed to the main discussion of  this article, some 
important conceptual frames would be discussed briefly. The discussion 
aims to provide a theoretical umbrella for the main discussion and field-
findings. The below notes on theories are essential as giving a clearer 
understanding on working concept of  the article. The notes are devoted 
to two important discussions: the conceptual distinction between ulama 
and the Islamist and significant concepts on radicalism.
Bridging the Unbridgeable: the Islamist and the Ulama 
Current scholarly works particularly make a clear distinction 
various manifestations and interpretation of  Islam. One of  often-used 
theoretical concepts to define Islamic interpretation is through the 
excessive distinction between the moderate and radical Islam.8 Jamhari, 
for instance, defines radical Islam through institutional development in 
contemporary Indonesia and point to groups who strive to implement 
sharia law.9 The moderate on the other hand, Freedman argues, refers to 
the groups of  Muslim who strongly advocates for democracy and civil 
rights.10 Nevertheless, the distinction between radical and moderate Islam 
has been misleading as excluding the fact that the two may flourish the 
same socio-cultural-political context that allows them to establish an 
intense contact. Thus, there is likely a shared vision between the two, 
8 Judith Miller, “The Challenge of  Radical Islam,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 
2, 1993, pp. 43.
9 Jamhari, “Mapping Radical Islam in Indonesia,” Studia Islamika, Vol. 10, No. 
3, 2003, pp. 1–28.
10 Amy L. Freedman, “Civil Society, Moderate Islam, and Politics in Indonesia 
and Malaysia,” Journal of  Civil Society Vol. 5, No. 2, 2009, pp. 107–127.
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such as the need to protect and preserved Islamic tradition. Both radical 
and moderate Muslim are indeed in the same boat in terms of  their 
conservative ideas to preserve the authenticity of  religion.
The misleading distinction also appears in the scholarly discussion 
on Islamic activism. Scholars generally divide Muslim authority into the 
Islamist and ulama. As for the ulama, they are particularly an expert of 
Islamic knowledge and tradition, mainly on classical Islamic studies. For 
many, ulama is the holder of  Islamic authority and the most authoritative 
to speak about Islam. Ulama is often defined as the guardian of  Islamic 
tradition, thus they are particularly conservative for protecting the past.11 
The Islamist on the other hand is preferably a Muslim political activist 
rather than a Muslim scholar. Despite the fact there is a Muslim scholar 
who happens to be a political activist, they differ in terms orientation. 
If  the ulama preserves Islam in terms of  ideas, the Islamist on the other 
hand strive to implement the religious texts into the contemporary 
realities. In other words, the character of  traditional ulama is conservative 
but politically passive and otherwise the Islamist. An ulama tends to limit 
their authority on the textual boundaries of  Islamic tradition, but the 
Islamist make current situations as their prime reference while bringing 
the past as the ideal form of  contemporary society. The Islamist strive 
to bring the past into the present. Nevertheless, both Islamist and ulama 
are having the same orientation: the need to protect the past through the 
present, but they differ in the scale of  Islam in contemporary societies.
Furthermore, ulama is also renowned for, partly because of  their 
conservative orientation, their rejection on progressive and liberal ideas. 
Liberalism has been seen as a threat to Islamic tradition because calling 
for rationalism and locating revelation at the margin of  Islamic discourse. 
11 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Pluralism, Democracy, and The Ulama,” Robert 
W. Hefner (ed.), Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization (Princeton 
& Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 69; Alexander Bligh, “The Saudi 
Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participant in the Political System of  the Kingdom,” Syafiq 
A. Mughni (ed.), An Antology of  Contemporary Middle Eastern History (Montreal, Quebec, 
Canada: Indonesia-Canada Islamic Higher Education Project, t.t).
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Ulama and the Islamist are in the same boat while judging progressive and 
liberal ideas. While ulama sees the danger of  liberalism upon the faith, the 
Islamist tend to reject liberalism because of  the issue of  westernisation.
They oppose the position of  reason within progressive and liberal ideas. 
For the Islamist and ulama, reason can only operate within the limits of 
revelation and reason should be used in areas where there is no explicit 
revelation.12 As Muhammad Qasim Zaman writes, religious conservatism 
happens to be a meeting point between ulama and the Islamist. They are 
indeed in collaboration to win the zeal of  Islam and to protect Muslim 
from liberal ideas. 
Apart from the reaction against progressive and liberal ideas, 
politics is another factor that unites the ulama and the Islamist. Although 
traditional ulama are mainly apolitical, they are likely to be involved in 
politics when the legitimacy and political control of  the government 
weakens. According to Arnold H. Green, controlling the government 
often invokes the politics of  ulama, thus blurring the distinction between 
the concept of  ulama in traditional sense and the Islamist. When the 
government has an effective and strong control over the community, 
ulama tend to be politically passive. Green further argues that the politics 
of  ulama particularly occurs in a context where the state’s authority is 
absent or decreasing. The ulama would likely react as a shadow state as 
taking over the roles belonged to the state.13 Thus, the ulama is acting as 
that of  the Islamist. However, the preceding statement does not mean 
that the ulama and the Islamist are indistinguishable. The relationship 
between the two is complex, often contradictory and in competition. The 
Islamists often accuses the ulama of  ignorant about the real problems 
of  the modern world. The Islamic knowledge of  ulama is considered as 
12 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of 
Change (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 171-172.
13 Arnold H. Green, “Political Attitudes and Activities of  the Ulama in the 
Liberal Age: Tunisia as an Exceptional Case,” Abubaker A. Bagader (ed.), The Ulama in 
the Modern Muslim Nation-State (Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of  Malaysia, 
1983), p. 175.
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old-fashioned and failed to synchronise to contemporary worlds and to 
answer problems. The ulama on the other hand confesses their Islamists 
counterpart as having insufficient academic qualifications to interpret 
texts of  Islam (Qur’an and sunna); thus unauthoritative to speak on 
behalf  of  Islam.14 
Radical and Radicalisation
There has been a changing meaning among scholars on Indonesian 
Islam when it comes to the term “radical”. The term ‘radical’ term did not 
imply any negative connotation whatsoever as we read through the work 
of  a Japanese scholar Mitsuo Nakamura when reviewing the politics of 
NU in the 1970s.15 Nevertheless, along with the proliferation of  religious 
violence and terrorism in a global context, the term ‘radical’ has been 
imbued with a new meaning denoting a reserve to violence. Radical 
does not merely imply a stand or attitude demanding a fundamental 
transformation, but it also connotes an act of  violence for that change. 
The US-based civil society organisation, The International Republican 
Institute (IRI), uses the word ‘radical’ in two generic terms: radical 
cognitive and radical behaviour. Cognitive radicals refer to whomever 
who approves of  violence but avoiding to take a part in any violent 
action. In contrast, radical behaviour is referring to anyone who resorts 
to any act of  violence while participating in the action on the basis of 
the ideology they believe in.16 
The term radical, according to Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 
of  Current English, is similar to the word ‘militant’ which means “the use 
14 Ahmad Aziz, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964 (London, 
Bombay, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967).
15 Mitsuo Nakamura, “The Radical Traditionalism of  the Nahdlatul Ulama in 
Indonesia: A Personal Account of  the 26th National Congress, June 1979, Semarang”, 
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1981, pp. 200-201. 
16 Team, Violent Extremism in Indonesia (Washington: The International 
Republican Institute, 2017), p. 4.
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force or strong pressure to arrive at a certain goal.”17 The term ‘militant’, 
as Abdullah Saeed uses, is also often used interchangeably with the label 
jihadist.18 As for the term ‘Islamic radicalism’, it particularly refers to an 
Islamic movement that struggles to radically change the structure of 
societies. The term is attributed to any Islamic movement that strives to 
fundamentally reform or change socio-cultural-political of  societies. The 
group particularly demands both the establishment of  an Islamic state 
and the codification of  sharia as the state law and resorts to violence acts 
for arriving at these aims. 
Nevertheless, there are also differences between radicalism, 
extremism, and terrorism. Radicalism is a mode of  thought of  literalism, 
intolerance, anti-system, and revolutionary. When these four indicators 
are translated into any violence act, thus changing the scale from 
radicalism to extremism. Likewise, when violence is intended for an 
act of  terror, the scale expands into terrorism. At processual level, the 
transformation from radicalism—and Islamic radicalism—to terrorism 
needs a close examination. Fathali M. Moghaddam identifies four stages 
of  radicalisation which culminates to terrorism. First, the emergence of 
the perception of  injustice or disparity contradicts with idealism which 
leads to frustration. Second, the frustration further initiates anger against 
whomever perceived being responsible for the injustice. Third, the state 
of  responsibility and justification for violence acts emerges and leads 
to the participation in the acts of  terrorism. Finally, dehumanizing the 
enemy in order to justify their violence victims.19
Clark Mcauley and Sophia Moskalenko explain four levels of  radical 
subjects: Sympathizers, those who agree, even if  they do not take part in 
the violence. Supporter, is a who justifies acts of  violence committed by 
17 AP. Cowie (ed.), Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of  Current English (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 784.
18 Abdullah Saeed, “Trends in Contemporary Islam: A Preliminary Attempts 
at a Classification”, The Muslim World, Vol. 97, 2007, pp. 398.
19 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological 
Exploration,” The American Psychological Association, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2005.
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those who want to achieve their goals. Activist, those involved in illegal 
activities. They provide things needed by those who want to achieve their 
aim by illegal actions: recruitment, provide political or financial support. 
Radical, who are not only convinced but they are also willing to commit 
acts of  violence and other illegal actions.20 
The Muslim Leaders in Sampang: A Closer Look at the Narratives 
The spectrum of  narratives of  Islam in Sampang extent from 
intolerant, radical, to extremist narratives.21 These spectrum particularly 
develops because of  the feeling-threatened and global conspiracy against 
Islam. The Muslim leaders in Sampang believe that non-Muslims, 
especially the Christians and the Jews, are in a continuous conspiracy 
to destroy Islam. They particularly points to the global politics, to the 
political dispute between Palestine and Israel, and military supports of 
the US for the acquisition of  Palestine lands to the Israel. This global 
reference draws a conclusion the Muslim hatred towards the Jews and 
the Christians and an ample instance of  Western repression against the 
Muslim world. The Quranic verse (QS. al-Baqarah: 120) that reads “Walan 
tardla ‘anka al-yahudu wa la al-nasara hatta tattabi’a millatahum (and never will 
the Jews or the Christians approve of  you until you follow their religion)”22 
is often  used as a textual reference for the Muslim hatred towards the 
Jews and the Christians. Moreover, the Muslim leaders in Sampang also 
include the murtad (apostate from Islam) as their equivalent enemies to 
the Jews and the Christians.23 
20 Clark Mcauley & Sophia Moskalenko, “Measuring Political Mobilization: 
The Distinction between Activism and Radicalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 
21, No. 2, 2009. 
21 The Wahid Foundation, A Measure of  the Extent of  Socio-Religious Intolerance 
and Radicalism within Muslim Society in Indonesia (Jakarta: Wahid Foundation and Lembaga 
Survei Indonesia, 2017).
22 “And not once the Jews and Christians are willing to you until you follow 
their religion.”
23 Interview with one of  kiai, May 23, 2019. 
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Thus, it is not surprising that the Muslim leaders in Sampang 
highly contest the presence of  non-Muslim—kafir in their word—in their 
surroundings. They challenge the plan for building new churches, despite 
the local government has granted permission. They are particularly 
worried that the church becomes a mean of  Christian proselytization. 
The anti-Christian sentiment is not only translated into the 
rejection of  non-Muslim in the neighbourhood, but also incites a political 
imagination of  Indonesia as an Islamic state. To do so, the Muslim 
leaders in Sampang often frame non-Muslims as the dhimmi.24 In Islamic 
tradition, the concept of  dhimmi refers to “protected non-Muslim”. It 
connotes the obligation of  the Islamic state to provide protection for 
non-Muslim lives and properties in exchange for loyalty to the state. 
This narrative appears clearly in the words of  an interlocutor saying that 
“Christians must be obedient to Muslims or Islamic leaders.”25 In the 
Indonesian political system, rather that discrimination based on religion, 
every citizen regardless their identities and religion has equal rights in 
terms of  politics and public lives. The non-Muslim has an equal right to 
be appointed as political leaders and government officials as with their 
Muslim counterparts.
Beyond the inter-religious relation, the Muslim leaders of  Sampang 
demonstrates a degree of  frustration by the national politics. As the 
result of  their preference for Muslim favouritism, the Muslim leaders of 
Sampang felt that the Indonesian government keep marginalising Muslim 
and demand for Muslim favouritism for the government position. The 
result is that the current government has done inequity, even oppressed 
Muslims. They further blamed the government for being failed in 
protecting the Muslim from the threats of  Christian missionaries. For 
them, the root of  these problems is democracy. Indonesian democracy 
has facilitated rooms for non-Muslim to exercise their political power and 
24 Non-Muslim citizens must obedient to the authority of  Islamic leadership.
25 Interview with one of  Islamic teacher at SMA Negeri Sampang, May 24, 2019.
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religious mission, while sacrificing the rights of  Indonesian Muslim as 
the dominant religious group. They particularly believe that non-Muslim 
keeps embattling Islam and Muslim societies; thus if  the non-Muslim 
kafir is in power, the Muslim would suffer from injustice.26 
As consequence of  democratic denial, the Muslim leaders of 
Sampang argue that the schematic of  sharia is the solution. The word 
sharia is a powerful magnet to many important Muslim leaders in Sampang. 
One of  interlocutors further said that he and the ulama of  Sampang 
often gave advices to the Head of  Sampang District to implement sharia 
through regional regulations (Peraturan Daerah/Perda) copying its district 
neighbour Pamekasan that successfully  announced the slogan of Gerbang 
Salam, a stepping stone to implement sharia law in the region.27 For this 
cause, many Muslim leaders in Sampang show their consideration to 
a radical Muslim organisation Front Pembela Islam/FPI (the Islamic 
Defender Front). They particularly see the FPI as the truthful Indonesian 
Muslim organisation that struggles to protect Muslims and to implement 
the sharia law for the country.28 The branch of  FPI in Sampang on the 
other hand sees the supports as an opportunity to expand its influence. 
Moreover, one of  important elites of  the local Majelis Ulama Indonesia/
MUI (the Council of  Indonesian Ulama) in Sampang clearly demonstrates 
his support for the FPI’s sweeping activities to places that they consider 
as facilitating sinful acts.29 Thus it is not surprising that the FPI also 
plays important roles in the public hatred against the Shia community in 
Sampang. Again, the issue of  religious orthodoxy is a key issue behind 
the public rejection towards the Shia community. And the FPI has been 
at the forefront for this cause and currently its influence and Islamic 
26 Interview with one of  board of  PCNU Sampang, May 19, 2019.
27 Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, “Syariat Islam dan Pragmatisme Politik: Studi Kasus 
Penerapan Syariat Islam di Pamekasan Madura,” Agama dan Kontestasi Ruang Publik: 
Islamisme, Konflik, dan Demokrasi (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2011). 
28 Interview with one of  ustaz, May 25, 2019.
29 Interview with one of  board of  MUI Sampang, May, 23 2019.
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interpretation keeps resonating and expanding.30 
Actors, Networks and Strategies
As the above discussion, we see the intolerance and radical 
ideologies resonate clearly among the Muslim leaders in Sampang. The 
FPI plays decisive roles winning the hearts and minds of  traditionalist 
Muslim.31 According to a police officer in Sampang, the FPI has been an 
organization with many followers in Madura and its influence eclipses 
the NU.32 The local branch of  FPI in Madura was established 2004. The 
founder of  FPI, a hadrami Rizieq Shihab, officially launched the Bangkalan 
branch of  FPI in Blegah-Bangkalan and ever since has developed rapidly.33 
Supported by a wealthy entrepreneur Nasir Zaini who serves also as an 
influential leader of  Ikatan Keluarga Madura (IKAMRA) and Forum 
Madura Bersatu (FORMABES), the FPI established its branches in other 
districts in the island of  Madura. As a return, Rizieq Shihab appointed 
Nasir Zaini as the coordinator of  FPI in Madura.
Since 2004, Nasir Zaini has been actively recruiting new members 
of  the FPI. Importantly, he tried to convinced the Muslim leaders to 
join the movement. He successfully invited one of  most important kiai 
in Madura, kiai Abdullah Schal, the great-grand son of  the famous 19th 
century ulama Kiai Kholil Bangkalan. Abdullah Schal is the leader of 
pesantren Syaichona Cholil I. When his pesantren celebrates haflahat 
al-imtihan wa al-ikhtibar, the annual celebration of  the pesantren on 
3 September 2005, Abdullah Schal invited Rizieq Shihab to deliver his 
sermons. Hundreds of  important kiai in Madura attended the celebration 
which turned to be a field for the FPI recruitment. By the eve of  the 
30 Interview with one of  kiai, May 23, 2019.
31 Saifuddin, “Kekerasan Atas Nama Tuhan: Studi Kasus Kekerasan FPI 
Yogyakarta,” IN RIGHT: Jurnal Agama dan Hak Asasi Manusia, Vol 1, No 1, 2011. 
32 Interview with one police, May 21, 2019.
33 Mohammad Tikno Muyono, Dakwah Front Pembela Islam (FPI) di Kabupaten 
Bangkalan: Studi Kualitatif  tentang Gerakan Amar Ma’ruf  Nahi Munkar, Thesis, IAIN Sunan 
Ampel Surabaya, 2009.
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celebration, tens of  attending Muslim leaders pledged their loyalty to the 
FPI. Ever since, the FPI was massively expanding and establishing many 
branches in the Island of  Madura. As the FPI’s influence is successfully 
escalating, the organisation reserves as an important Muslim organisation 
in the Island of  Madura. Not only that the FPI has attracted many 
important Muslim leaders, but also it has enhanced its political position 
in local politics. Thus, during the local election, almost every candidate 
for the head of  district (bupati) is seeking for the FPI’s political supports.34 
In returns, as one of  police officer in Sampang said, FPI finds a massive 
support from local politicians. This is one of  the reasons why the FPI is 
almost untouchable by the laws. In addition, the supports of  important 
kiai who serve as elites in the FPI further complicates the law supremacy.35
Moreover, the FPI in Sampang actively build its organisational 
networks through joint-activities with local organisation, such as the 
Aliansi Ulama Madura/AUMA. The AUMA was officially by KH. Zubair 
Muntashor on 31 October 2015 at Pesantren Nurul Kholil Bangkalan.36 
Despite the fact that firstly inaugurated in Bangkalang, the AUMA has its 
office in Lenteng Village in Pamekasan. The organisation has established 
its branches in many cities in the Island of  Madura and a renowned kiai 
Jakfar Shodiq serves as the chairman of  AUMA in Sampang. There has 
been a shared leadership between the AUMA and the FPI. The leaders 
of  AUMA are also important elites in the FPI.37 The chairperson of 
AUMA in Pamekasan is kiai Ali Karrar Sinhaji. Together with activists 
of  the FPI, kiai Karrar and the santri of  Pesantren Ma’had Islami Darut 
Tauhid (MISDAT) were involved in the attack against the Shia community. 
actions that led to the burning and expulsion of  the Shia Sampang. 
Likewise, a member of  the advisory board of  AUMA kiai Abdullah 
34 Interview with one of  Sampang Ministry of  Religion official, May 22, 2019. 
35 Interview with one police, May 21, 2019.
36 Luthfi Bashori, “Deklarasi Aliansi Ulama Madura (AUMA),” http://www.
pejuangislam.com/main.php?prm=karya&var=detail&id=1090, accessed August, 27 2019.
37 Interview with one of  Sampang Ministry of  Religion official, May 22, 2019.
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Khon Thobroni is the chairperson of  the FPI in Madura. Kiai Thobroni 
further transformed his Pesantren Roudlatul Muta’allimin al-Aziziyah II 
as the base of  FPI in Madura. Thus, there has been shared elites, joint-
activities, and offices between the FPI and the AUMA. Thus, it is not 
surprising that my interlocutors said that “both the FPI and the AUMA 
are the same organisation.”38
Besides the FPI, the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia/HTI is a secretly 
growing organisation in Sampang. Since the Indonesian government 
officially declared the HTI as a prohibited organisation, the state law 
does not prevent the HTI’s activists to clandestinely disseminate its 
transnational ideology. The HTI is particularly active in southern part 
of  Sampang and its influence particularly resonates among students 
of  secular schools, wealthy individuals, and government officers.39 For 
one of  my interlocutor, the HTI successfully infiltrated local political 
parties, educational institutions, and Islamic organizations as well as the 
government bureaucracy. Even the NU in Madura failed to escape from 
the HTI’s influence. The mode of  infiltration surely further complicates 
the state’s effort to recognise the banned HTI activism. Despite the fact 
that the HTI expands the organisation’s influence to a wider society 
and other Muslim organisation, there has been no record of  its activist 
in any criminal activities which is in contrast to the FPI.40 Both the 
FPI dan the HTI exercise the same infiltration method. Winning the 
aspiration of  kiai and recruiting him into the movement are a likely 
preferred method of  mobilisation.41 This strategic mobilisation is closely 
related to the central position of  kiai in Madurese culture. Thus, it is not 
surprising that both the HTI and the FPI develops rapidly in Sampang. 
My interlocutors admitted that the member of  FPI in Sampang reaches 
to 10.000 activists, while the HTI has around 500 activists. The activists 
38 Interview with one police, May 21, 2019
39 Focus Group Discussion (FGD), May 13, 2019.
40 Ibid.
41 Interview with one of  kiai, May 23, 2019.
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of  the FPI particularly centres in the northern part of  Sampang, such 
as in the area of  Karang Penang, Robatal, Ketapang and Sokabonah, 
whereas the FPI dominates in the Southern part of  Sampang.42 
 Even though having been maintained as the guardian of  Islamic 
traditionalism in Indonesian Muslim landscape, contemporary kiai 
in Madura has to face the attempts of  both the HTI and the FPI to 
join the movements. As for my interlocutors, some Muslim leaders in 
Sampang were venerable to the HTI’s khilafah campaign. The idea of 
establishing a global Islamic government under the banner of  khilafah 
is an interactive ideological alternative for some my interlocutors. The 
failure of  the Indonesian state to distribute economy resources properly 
and wars in many Muslim countries are references to justify the khilafah 
doctrine. Likewise, they are in the same boat when seeing the need of 
implementing sharia law for Indonesian Muslim. One of  respected kiai 
further acknowledged that both the NU and HTI could be partners 
to implement sharia and to establish a global khilafah. Furthermore, he 
claims that the HTI opts of  the opinion of  Islamic traditionalism. The 
organisation does not challenge Islamic rituals, such as tahlilan, dhibaiyah 
and yasinan, which are popular among the traditionalist Muslim.43 Another 
respected kiai who serves as an important leader of  the MUI in Sampang 
further admitted his close relationship with the members of  HTI. Despite 
unwillingly conveying his participation in the HTI, he maintained that 
the HTI and the NU are in agreement on the theology of  ahl al-Sunnah 
wa al-Jama’ah. In politics, rather that opting the opinion of  the NU on the 
Pancasila state, he stressed the HTI’s political campaign: that the Muslim 
government should be based on Islam and sharia as the constitution of 
the state.44 
Thus, the rapidly growing influence of  the FPI and the HTI, 
through the methods of  widening networks to the NU’s bases of 
42 Interview with one of  Sampang Ministry of  Religion official, May 22, 2019.
43 Ibid.
44 Interview with one of  board of  MUI Sampang, May, 23 2019.
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pesantren and important kyai, serves as an alarm to the traditionalist NU. 
The NU’s influence in the society has been confronted by the HTI and 
the FPI that actively carried out mobilisation activities. As an anecdote 
says “kiai in Sampang are NU, but thousands of  santri are the member 
of  FPI”. The growing organisation structure of  the FPI and the HTI 
in the heartland of  Islamic traditionalism reserves indicates a challenge 
to the slogan of  the NU as the backbone of  moderate Islam. Thus, as 
this article argues, there has been a massive radicalisation among the 
traditionalist Indonesian Muslim. The FPI and the HTI are two leading 
organisations in contemporary Sampang that successfully winning the 
hearts and minds of  the Muslim leaders in the region.
Conclusion 
The proliferation of  radical ideologies that circulates around the 
Muslim leaders, particularly the kiai, indicates a challenge to the form 
of  moderate Islam in Sampang. It tempers the long-admired slogan that 
kiai is the guardian of  Islamic traditionalism and serves as one of  main 
pillars of  moderate Islam in Indonesia. Thus, as this article suggests, there 
has been a cross-cutting ideological point and, in scholarly speaking, a 
conceptual fallacy to over emphasis on the organisational structure while 
sacrificing the cultural aspects. The Muslim leaders of  Sampang for 
instance has demonstrated a high-degree of  radicalisation and they find 
the radical Muslim organisations as their organisational alliance to the 
NU. Religious conservativism is the meeting narrative where the radical 
and the traditionalist are likely in agreement. One of  ample indication 
of  religious conservativism is the call for protecting the orthodox Islam 
-the truthful understanding of  the religion- and the place of  sharia in 
the public sphere. This religious conservativism further leads to a cross 
alliance -both ideological and organisational- between the traditionalist 
and the radical. 
As far as the Muslim leaders in Sampang are concerned, their 
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Islamic interpretation surely mirrors the ideological underpinning of  the 
radical, despite the fact that they are the members of  the traditionalist NU. 
This finding reserves as a warning-alarm for the traditionalist NU for the 
massive radicalisation in Madura, the heartland of  Islamic traditionalism 
in Indonesia. Despite the fact that terrorism narrative does not resonate 
among the Muslim leaders, their radical and intolerant narratives resorts 
as a first step for further acceleration that could potentially echo the 
terrorist’s agenda. 
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